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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether pre-crisis international reserve accumulations, as well as exchange rate
and reserve policy decisions made during the global financial crisis, can help to explain cross-country
differences in post-crisis economic performance. Our approach focuses not only on the total stock
of official reserves held by countries, but also on the decisions by governments to purchase or sell
reserve assets during the crisis period.  We introduce new data made available through the IMF Special
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Reserve Template, which allow us to distinguish interest income
and valuation changes in the stock of official reserves from the actively managed component of reserves.
 We use this novel data to gauge how (and whether) reserve accumulation policies influenced the economic
and financial performance of countries during and after the global crisis. Our findings support the
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1.  Introduction 
The global financial crisis wreaked havoc on world markets and has led to major 
economic dislocation around the world.  Initially it was the developed countries that bore the 
brunt of the crisis, but by mid-2008 the crisis was global; financing for emerging markets dried 
up and credit spreads for emerging market debt rose dramatically, raising concerns about their 
ability to refinance their debt.  After the Lehman Brother’s collapse in September 2008, many 
trade-oriented countries saw exports plunge leading to sharp contractions of GDP.  Countries 
with high levels of debt were also hard hit, with many countries forced to allow their currency to 
depreciate and/or draw down their foreign currency reserves.  The governments of countries with 
exceptionally large banking sectors took over their liquidity-strapped banks, converting private 
sector debts to public sector debts. Some countries were hit more strongly by the crisis 
(especially in Central and Eastern Europe) while others, at least initially, appeared more 
shielded.  Many of these emerging market countries had accumulated impressive stocks of 
international reserves prior to the global crisis. This paper examines whether these pre-crisis 
international reserve accumulations, as well as exchange rate and reserve policy decisions made 
during the crisis, can help to explain cross-country differences in post-crisis economic 
performance.  
We begin with an analysis of initial conditions in order to better understand the choices 
countries faced when the global crisis struck.  An important component of this analysis focuses 
on pre-crisis international reserve accumulation.  In the years since the regional crises in the 
1990s a number of countries, especially in East Asia, were thought to have built up excessive 
international reserve portfolios.  If the main rationale for accumulating reserves was to provide 
precautionary self-insurance, the global financial crisis would seem to be the ultimate vindication 
for that strategy.  Yet recent studies by Blanchard, Faruqee and Das (2010) and Aizenman and 
Sun (2010) find that even countries with high levels of reserves were reluctant to use (or lose) 
them. They find little evidence that reserves were important buffers to the crisis. 
Our analysis reexamines the findings and interpretations in the literature about the role of 
reserves during crises. First, we argue that the decision by governments not to deplete reserves 
during the crisis does not necessarily provide evidence against the positive role for reserves in 
self-insurance.  Indeed, high reserve stocks prior to the crisis may have protected countries 
against speculative attacks, which would require drawing down reserves, and which would have 
otherwise occurred.  Reserves in this context may be analogous to the lender of last resort 
facilities in central banks. Second, our graphical analysis of country-by-country reserve changes 
suggests that one has to be careful in defining the timing of crises, which are likely to differ 
across countries. The range of currency and reserve defense strategies used by countries is lost in  
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the regressions reported in the current literature which generally use the same crisis timing for all 
countries. 
  The derivation of optimal reserve levels has long been contentious.  Recent experience 
suggests that models have underestimated the threshold level of reserves after which risk 
perceptions about a country rise non-linearly and dramatically.  Further, the widely differing 
levels of reserve stocks held by emerging countries indicate significant heterogeneity in desired 
threshold levels (perhaps based on past experience during crises as Hashimoto and Ito (2007) 
emphasize).  More importantly, recent evidence suggests that once reserves fall below the 
threshold, net new capital inflows abruptly end, leading to debt rollover problems and capital 
flight. These capital flow reversals can, in turn, increase the pace of reserve depletion.  South 
Korea through the current crisis is a case in point.  In 2008 there was concern that Korea’s total 
external debt maturing over the coming year would exceed its level of international reserves.  
Korean officials were also concerned about their losses due to the unwinding of currency hedges 
for canceled export orders. In addition to depleting some of its reserves, Korean authorities opted 
to draw on their swap line with the Fed in the midst of the crisis in order not to breach their 
perceived threshold level of reserves. 
Our approach focuses not only on the total stock of official reserves held by countries, 
but also on the decisions by governments to purchase or sell reserve assets during the crisis 
period.  We introduce new data made available through the IMF Special Data Dissemination 
Standard (SDDS) Reserve Template, which allow us to distinguish interest income and valuation 
changes in the stock of official reserves from the actively managed component of reserves.  We 
use this novel data to gage how (and whether) reserve accumulation policies influenced the 
economic and financial performance of countries during and after the global crisis. 
 
2.  Why Do Countries Hold International Reserves? 
 
International reserves held by monetary authorities (typically in the Central Bank, 
Treasury, or Ministry of Finance) are part of national wealth, and were originally important for 
countries with fixed exchange rates that wanted to avoid costly adjustments to disturbances in the 
external sector of the economy.  For a country with fixed exchange rates, international reserves 
are a necessary buffer to maintain the regime. However, in this view of reserves, if a country 
moves away from a fixed exchange rate regime, it is less clear how much of a share of the 
national wealth should be devoted to international reserve assets.  It is worth noting that when 
monetary authorities acquire international reserves they typically sterilize the effect of these 




1 Likewise, reserves held by the fiscal authority are typically 
financed with domestic government bills.  Hence, international reserves in most countries are not 
net national assets.  If the interest rate on reserve assets is lower than the domestic interest rate, 
holding reserves incurs quasi-fiscal costs. Countries with large stocks of international reserves 
and a high domestic interest rate may inadvertently be counter-parties to the carry trade.  While 
carry-traders borrow in low interest currencies and invest in high interest currencies, most 
reserve building countries invest in low interest foreign currencies and borrow at the (relatively 
higher) domestic interest rate.
2 Countries with domestic interest rates that are lower than the 
interest rate on reserve assets (e.g., Japan) benefit from net interest income on reserves; in this 
case reserve accumulation can be regarded as a form of public carry-trade.  Holding reserves also 
exposes the country to currency risk. If the domestic currency appreciates vis-à-vis the currencies 
denominating the reserve assets, the domestic currency value of reserves drops. These valuation 
risks can, at least in theory, be mitigated if the reserve assets are diversified.  
  Countries accumulate reserves for precautionary purposes against current and capital 
account shocks and as a byproduct of intervention strategies to keep the international value of the 
domestic currency stable and low in order to boost export growth (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and 
Garber (2003)).
3  There have been a number of recent empirical studies attempting to test 
whether the precautionary or exchange rate stability motive better explains international reserve 
accumulations by both industrialized and developing countries.  These studies generally find 
evidence in support of both motivations (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee (2007)), while at 
the same time finding that neither motivation fully explains the upsurge in reserve accumulations 
by developing countries starting in 2000 (Jeanne (2007) and Jeanne and Ranciere (2007)).  Three 
recent studies that come to the conclusion that reserve accumulations through 2007 were not 
excessive include: Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) who gage reserve adequacy against 
the size of the banking sector, Hashimoto and Ito (2007) who focus on the adequacy of reserves 
to maintain exchange rate stability, and Dominguez (2010) who focuses on the role for reserves 
in countries with underdeveloped financial markets.  
                                                            
1  If the central bank does not sterilize its foreign reserve purchases it increases its domestic liabilities when 
its foreign assets increase.  If the central bank sterilizes, it effectively reduces its net assets.  In both cases the net 
worth of the central bank is unchanged. 
2 A conspicuous exception to this is the case of Japan, and possibly China. The interest rate of Japan’s 
fiscal bills that have been issued to maintain foreign reserves is markedly lower than the US Treasury interest rate. 
The special account of the foreign exchange fund managed by the Japanese Ministry of Finance has recorded net 
interest gains in the last 20 years. See Ito (2003, 2007a) for details of the balance sheet of the account, and interest 
income.  This suggests that Japanese foreign reserve operations are essentially engaged in carry-trade, pursuing net 
interest income with exposure to currency risk.        
3 There is a large literature exploring the motivation for and efficacy of foreign exchange intervention 
policy in developed countries (see, for example, Adams and Henderson (1983), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), 
Dominguez (2006b), Ito (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007b) and Ito and Yabu (2007)).  The efficacy of intervention 
policies in developing countries has been less widely studied, in large part because governments have been reluctant 
to provide detailed data on their operations.  Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) document the extent to which the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has been sterilized by developing countries since 1990.  
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There are also a few studies that examine reserve policy during the most recent global 
crisis.  Aizenman and Sun (2010) document that many emerging market countries chose not to 
deplete their international reserves as part of the adjustment mechanism. Further, they find that 
the main factor distinguishing countries that did rely on reserves was their heavy trade 
orientation (measured with trade-openness, oil export share and commodity export ratios).  They 
suggest that these countries were less wary of depleting reserves when export markets collapsed, 
while most other countries opted for adjustment via exchange rate depreciation rather than 
reserve depletion.
4 Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009) and Aizenman, Jinjarak and Park 
(2011) document the heavy reliance on swap lines of inter-governmental credit during the crisis, 
especially by developed countries that did not have large reserve accumulations.  They suggest 
that swap lines may substitute for reserves for some countries.
5 
Precautionary and exchange rate stability motives for reserve accumulation may have 
been importantly connected for some countries in the pre-global crisis period, and may have 
contributed to the global imbalances that are often cited as playing a causal role in the global 
crisis.  Countries that experienced crises and decumulation of reserves in the late 1990s were in 
the process of rebuilding reserves in the years prior to the global crisis.  Reserve accumulation by 
these countries will have put downward pressure on their own currencies and contributed to 
external surpluses.   
 
3.  Measurement of International Reserves 
 
The term “international reserves” is not used consistently in the literature. The assets held by 
governments and monetary authorities for reserve purposes are interchangeably called “foreign 
reserves,” “official reserves,” or “international reserves;” even government publications often 
use different labels to describe the same category of assets. In this paper we stick to the naming 
conventions used by the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Reserve template.  
  Total official reserves (IR) are the broadest definition of international reserves. This 
concept includes foreign currency reserves (ForexR) and non-currency reserves, which include 
monetary gold (Gold), Special Drawing Rights (SDR), the reserve position at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other reserve assets (Other).  Foreign currency reserves (ForexR), in 
                                                            
4  In the context of the mercantilist versus precautionary motives, we should expect a mercantilist country 
to prefer depreciation over foreign reserve depletion.  Indeed the motivation to accumulate reserves for mercantilists 
is to prevent appreciation when experiencing capital inflows.  At the same time, mercantilist countries should be 
delighted to allow the exchange rate to depreciate when experiencing capital outflows.  On the other hand, a country 
motivated by precaution should prefer to deplete foreign reserves in the face of capital outflows in order to preserve 
exchange rate stability.  The precautionary motive should lead countries to accumulate reserves during times of 
capital inflows in order that they are available for use during times of capital outflow. 
5 As we will describe in more detail in section 3, it is important to recognize that swap lines that are drawn 
upon are part of a country’s international reserves.  
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turn, consist of two categories of financial assets, securities (SEC) and currencies and deposits 
(DEPO).  In equations: 
 
  (3.1)    IR = ForexR + Gold + SDR + IMF + Other 
  (3.2)  ForexR = SEC + DEPO 
 
The securities (SEC) and currencies and deposits (DEPO) component of official reserves reflect 
foreign reserve policy actions, including foreign exchange market intervention and reserve 
portfolio management (involving shifts between currency denomination and asset maturities). 
Our analysis in the next section focuses on the details of foreign reserve policy actions reflected 
in changes in ForexR. Other reserve assets (Other) consist of financial derivatives, loans to 
nonbank nonresidents and others, which generally make up a very small share of official 
reserves.
6  
  Cross-country data are available for IR, ForexR, Gold, SDRs, IMF reserves, and Other, 
so that it is possible to measure each component in equation (3.1). The one reserve component 
that is not available is the breakdown of assets between securities and deposits (SEC and DEPO) 
in the foreign currency component of reserves (ForexR).  In this study we therefore focus on a 
new source of data provided through the SDDS in the Reserve Template which provides data on 
all these categories of reserves, including the breakdown of SEC and DEPO.  
  While the definition of official reserves seems straight forward, the details regarding 
what assets should be included or excluded has evolved over time.  Conceptually international 
reserves should be denominated in foreign currency, owned by the government or monetary 
authority, and should be highly liquid.
7  Reserves held at the IMF, both a country’s “reserve 
tranche” as well as IMF loans, are included
8, as are certain assets held in special purpose 
                                                            
6 The average share of ‘other’ in IR for the SDDS countries is 2.84% and the median is .04%; for 80% of 
the countries in the sample the share is between 0 and 3%.  The country with the largest share (45%) of ‘other’ is 
South Africa between 2003 and 2005, followed by Norway in 2003-4 and New Zealand in 2006.  The financial 
derivatives component of ‘other’ is zero for most countries; the average share of financial derivatives in IR is .05%. 
7According to the sixth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual (BPM6), a country’s international 
reserve assets refer to “those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for 
meeting balance of payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange rate, and for other related purposes (such 
as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis for foreign borrowing). Reserve 
assets must be foreign currency assets and assets that actually exist.” (Chapter 6, 6.64; p.111)  In the case of the 
United States, international reserves are held in the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) and the Federal 
Reserve's System Open Market Account (SOMA). Among the SDDS compliant countries Argentina, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and the UK separately report reserves held by the central government 
(CG) and the monetary authority (MA).  
8 A country’s “reserve position in the IMF is the sum of (a) the “reserve tranche,” that is, the foreign 
currency (including SDRs) amounts that a member country may draw from the IMF at short notice; and (b) any 
indebtedness of the IMF (under a loan agreement) in the General Resources Account that is readily available to the 
member country, including the reporting country’s lending to the IMF under the General Arrangements to Borrow 
(GAB) and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). While a member country must present a declaration of 
balance of payments–related need to make a purchase in the reserve tranche (reduction in reserve position), the IMF 
does not challenge a member’s request for reserve tranche purchases” BPM6 (Chapter 6, 6.85; pp. 114).  
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government funds (often termed Sovereign Wealth funds, SWFs)
9 and assets created under 
reciprocal facilities (swap arrangements)
10. There is an interesting historical progression between 
how countries measured reserves in the 1990s (before and during crises) and how the IMF 
responded with new restrictions on these funds.  Appendix A provides some of these country-
specific examples. 
Some SWF assets, including assets managed by Singapore’s Government Investment 
Corporation (GIC), are included in the country’s international reserves, since the corporation is 
designated as a manager of international reserves.  However, the assets in Singapore’s 
TEMASEC, another SWF, are not included in the country’s international reserves, since these 
assets include equities and other illiquid assets. Assets in the Chinese  sovereign wealth fund, 
CIC, are most likely not in Chinese international reserves, as they were created to diversify 
international reserves, mostly US Treasury bonds, into high-risk, high-return assets, such as 
stakes in financial institutions and alternative assets, which would not qualify as international 
reserves. 
In response to concerns in both the financial markets and by creditor governments to 
perceived problems with international reserve measurement as well as the reliability of other key 
macroeconomic variables, the IMF launched the SDDS in April 1996 in an effort to guide 
countries in the collection and timely publication of economic and financial data, including 
international reserves data.
11  Nevertheless during the Asian financial crisis proper disclosure of 
international reserves became an issue for the affected governments. By June 1997 forty-one 
countries, including all of the crisis-hit Asian countries—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
                                                            
9 “Assets held in special purpose government funds that meet the definition of reserve assets are classified 
within reserve assets depending on their nature. So, if the special purpose government funds hold deposits, 
securities, and other reserve assets, these are classified as such within reserve assets. Assets held in a resident special 
purpose government fund that are claims on nonresidents but do not meet the criteria to be classified as reserve 
assets are classified in the financial account and IIP under the appropriate instrument and functional category. If 
special purpose government funds own direct investment equity and debt securities that could be classified in either 
direct investment or reserves assets, as general guidance, in the hierarchy of the balance of payments and IIP 
between direct investment and reserve assets, the equity securities should be classified as direct investment ahead of 
reserve assets, and debt securities should be classified as reserve assets ahead of direct investment” BPM6 (Chapter 
6, 6.98; pp. 116). 
10 “Assets created under reciprocal facilities (swap arrangements) for the temporary exchange of deposits 
between the central banks of two economies warrant mention. Deposits (in foreign exchange) acquired by the central 
bank initiating the arrangement are treated as reserve assets because the exchange provides the central bank with 
assets that can be used to meet the economy’s balance of payments financing needs and other related purposes. 
Reciprocal deposits acquired by the partner central bank also are considered reserve assets, as long as they meet the 
general criteria for being reserve assets, if they are denominated and settled in a convertible currency. Lines of credit 
that could be drawn on and foreign exchange resources that could be obtained under swap agreements are not 
reserve assets because they do not constitute existing claims” BPM6 (Chapter 6, 6.102; pp. 117). 
11 The SDDS is one of the IMF’s Data Dissemination Standards initiatives and subscription is voluntary. It 
prescribes the coverage, periodicity (frequency), and timeliness of 18 data categories for the four sectors (real, 
financial, fiscal, and external sectors) of the economy. The data dissemination practice of the SDDS subscribers is 
monitored by the IMF and the countries receive a monthly report (which is not published) and an annual report 
(which is posted on the IMF website). In 1997 the IMF announced a second set of more generalized standards, the 
General Data Dissemination System (GDDS).  
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Korea—had subscribed to the SDDS.
12  However, governments in the midst of crisis were 
reluctant to fully disclose financial information.  Complicated questions arose over the 
composition and location of international reserve assets, as well as timeliness of data publication. 
The selective dissemination of data, which did not deviate from any standards at the time, seems 
to have been motivated by a desire on the part of governments to exaggerate usable, net (spot-
forward consolidated) international reserves.  (See Appendix A for details on the relationship 
between the Mexican and Asian currency crises and data transparency promoted by the IMF.) 
In response to the post-Asia crisis data issues, particularly the need for more transparent 
reserve data, the Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity 
(known as the Reserve Template) was approved at the Executive Board Meeting in 1998.
13 
Initially the SDDS only required countries to provide international reserve information on a 
gross basis, though information on reserve-related liabilities was also encouraged.  When the 
Reserve Template became effective, SDDS subscribers were required to provide detailed 
monthly reserve data by asset class (gold, SDRs, currency and deposits, securities, financial 
derivatives)
14 and location (reserves held in other national banks, BIS, IMF, or domestic and 
foreign commercial banks)
15 as well as detailed information on reserve-related liabilities.  
It is worth noting that outside of crisis periods countries with large reserve accumulations 
may have incentives to “understate” reserves, in an attempt to deflect criticism of mercantilist 
motives and excessive reserves.  Another consequence of the large accumulations of reserves in 
emerging countries is a new consciousness among monetary authorities of the risk of 
international reserve valuation losses
16 as well as criticism from the US concerning excessive 
official holdings of dollar-denominated assets.  In order to avoid these economic and political 
costs a number of countries with large reserve stocks have begun to pursue strategies that 
diversify their reserve holdings
17 and create new fund categories.  Although these funds are often 
                                                            
              
12 The first few years, April 1996 through December 31, 1998, were regarded as a formal transition period 
for the implementation of the SDDS, and a member “could subscribe to the SDDS even if its dissemination practices 
were not fully in line with the SDDS at that time” (Alexander 2008, p.10). 
13 During the Asian crisis, it was recognized that “the available data on the international reserves at that 
time did not give a complete or timely picture of the liquidity constraints some countries faced during 1997.” 
(Footnote 6 of page 11, Second Review of the Special Data Dissemination Standard, IMF, December 2, 1998. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/dsbb/1998/120298.pdf). 
14 In economies in which extensive reserve assets are held outside of the central bank, supplementary 
information is required on the institutional sector of holdings of those reserve assets (only external claims actually 
owned by the monetary authorities can be classified as reserves assets). 
               
15 The Reserve Template has four parts: I. Official Reserve Assets and Other Foreign Currency Assets; II. 
Predetermined Short-term Net Drains on Foreign Currency Assets; III Contingent Short-Term net Drains on Foreign 
Currency Assets; and IV. Memorandum Items. Part I of the Reserve Template, official reserve assets, shows the 
total amount of official reserve assets disaggregated into (1) foreign currency reserves, (2) IMF reserve position, (3) 
SDRs, (4) gold, and (5) other reserve assets. Data on official reserve assets and the Reserve Template for the SDDS 
subscribers are publicly available at the IMF’s website, http://dsbb.imf.org/Pages/SDDS/ReserveTemplates.aspx. 
16 Dominguez, Fatum and Vacek (forthcoming) examine the implications of systematic reserve 
decumulation (intended to mitigate valuation losses) on domestic currency movements. 
17 The dollar remains the dominant currency denomination for reserves, though there is some evidence that 
countries have begun to diversify into euro and yen, see Dominguez (1999, 2006a).  
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not officially defined as international reserves under IMF (BPM6) rules
18, nonetheless they could 
be used in times of crisis.  Table 1 provides information on selected sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs), detailing which countries with SWFs subscribe to the SDDS or participate in the 
GDDS, and whether SWF data are in BOP/IIP as of 2007 or 2010.   
  Swap arrangements between central banks are included in the Reserve Template (they are 
generally recorded as financial derivatives in Section II.2 of the Reserve Template, and if they 
are re-lent to commercial banks they are recorded in Section I.B).
19 One of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve policy responses to the global financial crisis was to provide liquidity to the interbank 
dollar market in December 2007.  The Fed simultaneously established the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), which provided funding to US banks, and reciprocal currency arrangements (known as 
“swap lines”), which provided funding to the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB).  The list of central banks to which swap lines were extended was 
expanded in September 2008 to include the central banks of Japan, England, Canada, Australia, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; and in October 2008 to New Zealand, Korea, Brazil, Singapore, 
and Mexico. The addition of the last four countries on the list was an unusual move in that these 
countries are regarded as emerging rather than advanced countries. The Fed swap arrangement 
allowed Mexico and Korea to temporarily replenish their foreign reserve stocks.  It is interesting 
that it was the Federal Reserve, and not the IMF, that provided dollar liquidity to these four 
countries.  It might also be considered controversial that only these four emerging market 
countries were offered swap lines.
20 Each swap line was originally due to expire in several 
months, they were later extended and finally expired in February 2010. The swap lines offered to 
the ECB (originally $20 billion), SNB (originally $4 billion), Bank of England (originally $40 
billion), and Bank of Japan (originally $60 billion) were uncapped (these banks could ask for any 
dollar amount) in October 2008.    
  Through these swap arrangements foreign central banks were able to obtain US dollars in 
exchange for their own currency with an agreement to reverse the transaction at a future date. 
The foreign central banks in turn provided dollar liquidity to commercial banks in their 
respective countries (Fleming and Klagge (2010) and Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2011) 
                                                            
18 SWFs could be defined as reserves if they allow “the monetary authorities control over the disposition of 
funds” BPM6 (Chapter 6, 6.95; pp. 115-116). 
19 The Fed does not include the ‘mirror-image’ of the swaps in their SDDS data (though they do appear in 
the BOP data), with the view that because the swaps are of short duration (3 months), and many of the currencies 
received are not highly liquid, they do not really ‘count’ as reserves.  There seems also to be wide variation in the 
approach taken by countries that drew on swap lines, in terms of where these appear in the Reserve Template.  
Receipts of foreign currencies due to the swap transactions may be recorded in some categories of the reserve 
template Section I.A. (which is the data we use in our analysis), but in which exact category they are recorded seems 
to depend on the country. 
20 At least one other Asian country requested, but was denied, a swap line with the Federal Reserve.  
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provide details on the Fed swap facilities established during the financial crisis).
21  The Federal 
Reserve swap lines were drawn heavily, most notably by the ECB, the BOE, and the BOJ, 
between September 2008 and December 2008, when the total of outstanding swap amounts 
reached $543 billion, as shown in Table 2.  Not all central banks used the established swap 
lines.
22 
  In order to understand the role of swap lines in the reserve data it is instructive to 
consider the case of South Korea. The Bank of Korea faced severe exchange market (outflow) 
pressure in the fall of 2008. News reports indicate that the Fed swap line (up to $30 billion) 
helped to calm investor concerns with Korea, especially when the swap line expiration date was 
extended (from April 30 to October 30, 2009) in February 2008. Later, on June 25, it was 
announced that the expiration date was further pushed back to February 1, 2010.  Consequently, 
for countries like Korea who had access to Fed swap lines from October 2008 to February 2010, 
stocks of foreign reserves (which include swap lines which are actually drawn
23) were 
temporarily inflated.   
  In addition to the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England and the Swiss National 
Bank provided the liquidity in Euro, British Pounds and Swiss Francs to other central banks 
during the global financial crisis. The swap lines established by the ECB to central banks of 
Hungary, Iceland, Denmark, and Poland seem to have been effective as they were heavily drawn 
upon (Aizenman, et al. (2011)).  Although the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) also provided 
swap lines to the central banks of Argentina, Belarus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, and 
Malaysia, these swap lines served a different purpose. The Chinese yuan is not a convertible 
currency and the Yuan was not part of the international liquidity shortage. The extension of these 
swap lines was motivated by the PBoC’s desire to make the Yuan more “international” and to 
help trade finance rather than to address any Yuan liquidity shortage, which was a moot issue 
(Ito (2011).   
  Country holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are also included in international 
reserves.  For many countries, especially advanced countries with relatively small international 
reserve positions, SDR fluctuations can be quite important.  A nation's IMF quota, the maximum 
amount of financial resources that it is obligated to contribute to the fund, determines its 
allotment of SDRs. The SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF, it is a potential claim 
on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. Holders of SDRs can obtain these currencies in 
exchange for their SDRs either through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges between 
                                                            
21 Initially, the Fed funded the dollar swap lines by reducing its holdings of Treasury securities, though as 
its various liquidity facilities grew, the Fed eventually allowed its liabilities to increase. In December 2008 there 
were $580 billion in swaps outstanding, which accounted for over 25 percent of the Fed’s total assets. 
22 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_swaplines.htm 
23 The following central banks did not draw on the swap arrangements: Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
Bank of Canada, Banco de Brasil, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Goldberg, et al. (2011, p. 11)).  
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members or, in some cases, by the IMF designating members with strong external positions to 
purchase SDRs from members with weak external positions. It is in this way that SDRs are 
transferred among IMF countries. General allocations of SDRs are based on long-term global 
needs to supplement existing reserve assets and have been made only three times, in 1970-72, in 
1979-81, and in 2009.
24  The most recent allocation was made to help mitigate the effects of the 
financial crisis and to enable all members of the IMF to participate in the SDR system on an 
equitable basis.  The 2009 allocation corrected for the fact that countries that joined the IMF 
after 1981—more than one fifth of the current IMF membership— had never received an SDR 
allocation.  Figure 1 shows the importance of specific components of international reserves: 
Figure 1a shows the 2009 SDR allocations for the U.S. Reserve Template and Figure 1b shows 
the impact of IMF loans in 2008 and 2009 for the Iceland Reserve Template. 
  
Figure 1a: United States International Reserve Assets, 2008-10 
 









Figure 1b: Iceland International Reserve Assets, 2008-10 
 
Note: arrows show IMF loans. 
 
4.  Measuring Reserve Changes 
 
Worldwide international reserves increased dramatically in the years prior to the onset of the 
global financial crisis.  Figure 2 indicates that rapid reserve accumulation was most dramatic in 
the economies of developing Asia, and to a lesser extent developing Europe, the Middle East and 
North Africa. As of the end of 2010, the top four reserve holding countries are China, Japan, 

























Official Reserves grow as a result of: (1) purchases of foreign currency reserve assets, (2) the 
receipt of interest income on existing assets, (3) capital gains on existing assets, and (4) increases 
in non-currency asset holdings. Recall from equation (3.1) that Official Reserve Assets (IR) are 
composed of foreign currency reserves (ForexR), Gold, SDRs, the reserve position in the IMF, 
and Other reserve assets. Foreign currency reserves, ForexR, is further divided into securities 
(SEC) and currency and deposits (DEPO). 
 
(3.1) IR= ForexR + Gold + SDR + IMF + Other 
      = (SEC + DEPO) + Gold + SDR + IMF + Other  
 
The change in official reserve assets from period t to t+1, ⊿IR, is the sum of the changes in 
outstanding balances of each of its components: 
 
(4.1) ⊿IR = r
s*SEC + r
d*DEPO + ⊿SEC + ⊿DEPO + ⊿Gold + ⊿SDR + ⊿IMF + ⊿Other 
 
where r
s is the interest rate on securities and r
d is the interest rate on deposits. Figures 1a and 1b 
show visually how changes in two of these components, new SDR allocations and IMF loans, 
influence reserve stocks.  Define the sum of changes in Gold, SDRs, IMF reserves, and Other, as 
Non-Currency Reserves (NonCR). Then, 
 




(4.3)  ⊿IR = r
s*SEC + r
d*DEPO + ⊿SEC + ⊿DEPO + ⊿NonCR 
 
The ⊿SEC + ⊿DEPO from period t to t+1 are the sum of the purchases and sales (⊿
PS) of 
reserve assets and valuation changes (⊿
val). We define the valuation changes as the passive 
component of foreign currency reserve management, while purchases and sales are the active 
component. We categorize these purchases and sales as “active management” because they are 
made at the discretion of authorities; they may be made for investment purposes, precautionary 
reasons, or for the purpose of influencing exchange rates.  In equations: 
 
(4.4) ⊿IR = r
s*SEC + r







valDEPO + ⊿NonCR 




Researchers often use changes in official reserves, ⊿IR, as a proxy for foreign exchange 
market interventions because few countries report these operations. However, as equation (4.4) 
shows, ⊿IR includes components that have nothing to do with intervention (or active 
management). Changes in reserves will be a particularly poor proxy for interventions when 
interest income or valuation changes are large. (⊿NonCR does not change frequently and 
available data allow these changes to be easily stripped from IR.) The conceptual problem 
inherent in using ⊿IR as a proxy for interventions is due to the nondisclosure of the composition 
of foreign currency reserves (ForexR).
25 Ideally, researchers would like data on the types of 
securities (by currency, maturity, and risk-class), and types of deposits (by currency, type of 
financial institution taking deposits, and domestic or foreign) held in ForexR, in order to analyze 
portfolio management of foreign currency reserves and intervention policy. However, in most 
countries this kind of detailed information is not made public.  
The SDDS Reserve Template, which requires reporting countries to break down the asset 
categories of foreign currency reserves, goes some way toward allowing researchers to estimate 
interest income. Unfortunately, details such as the currency composition of foreign currency 
                                                            
25 An alternative approach to isolating the purchases and sales of foreign currency reserve assets is to use “flow 
variables” reported in the Balance of Payments (BOP) data set. There are two potential ways to back out the “active 
management” component of reserves using the BOP statistics. First, using the Current Account, Capital Account, 
and Financial Account data, net foreign reserves can be inferred, though because these data come from different 
statistical inferences and aggregations, net errors and omissions are huge.  A second approach involves using the 
Reserves and Related Items category of the BOP, which records the market valued purchases and sales of reserve 
assets. These data also include non-currency components of official reserves.  Our approach is to strip the nonCR 









reserves are not provided in the Reserve Template. The method we use to estimate interest 
income is explained in the next section.   
The Reserve and Related Items category in the Balance of Payment Statistics (BOP) records 
the market valued purchases and sales of reserve assets. These data come directly from the 
balance sheet of the authorities and represent real transactions (at market value) because these 
data are compiled by authorities based on their transaction records. This data category also 
includes transactions of gold, SDRs, the reserve position in the IMF, and other assets. Using the 
notation of the ⊿IR equation, Reserves and Related Items (Res_BOP) can be expressed as 
follows: 
 




psDEPO + ⊿NonCR 
                                                                          
                                                                        
               
  
If we subtract Reserves and Related Items from changes in official reserves we can isolate 
valuation changes in foreign currency reserves. (Note that the actual entry of the Res_BOP has 
the opposite sign to ⊿IR, so that to derive the difference, the two series need to be added.)   
 




Because Res_BOP includes interest income and changes in NonCR (the transactions involving 
gold, reserves at the IMF, SDRs, and other assets) it, like ⊿IR, is not a good proxy for 
intervention.  But, together with estimates for interest income (which can be substantial for 
countries with large stocks of reserves), and information on nonCR, we use Res_BOP to 






5.  Active versus Passive Reserve Accumulation 
 
While all SDDS compliant countries report detailed, marked-to-market,
26 and timely 
international reserve data at end-of-month values, they (unfortunately) do not provide 
information about whether changes in reserves from the preceding month are due to passive 
valuation changes in the underlying assets held, or active purchases or sales of  reserves.
27  One 
of the objectives of this project is to understand whether reserves can serve as important buffers 
for countries during times of crisis.  In order to fully understand the role of reserves in times of 
crisis, however, it is important to distinguish between active and passive reserve changes.  If the 
values of some reserve assets are declining, which was likely the case during the global financial 
crisis, it follows that the value of country’s reserve stocks should have declined in the absence of 
active reserve accumulation.   So that recent studies that find limited evidence of reserve 
depletion during the crisis may be misinterpreting the data.
28 Stable reserve levels during the 
crisis may in fact indicate that countries were actively accumulating reserves (in order to offset 
valuation losses). 
In order to be able to distinguish between valuation changes and active accumulation or 
depletion of reserves we attempt to adjust the reserves data for changes in underlying asset 
values.  The SDDS Reserve Template data do not provide details on each asset held in the 
foreign currency (ForexR) component of official reserves but it does provide information on the 
broad composition of these reserves, specifically the share of these reserves held in securities 
(SEC) versus the share in currency and deposits (DEPO).  Information on the currency 
denomination of these assets, in turn, is available on an aggregated basis (the data are available 
for two groups: “advanced” and “emerging and developing” countries) from the Currency 
Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database
29. We use the monthly 
                                                            
26 The SDDS reserve template guidebook says, “values of foreign currency resources are to reflect what 
could be obtained for them in the market if they were liquidated; that is, at market prices on the reference date. In 
cases where determining market value on a frequent basis is impractical, approximate market values can be 
substituted during the intervening periods... The stock of equity securities of companies listed on stock exchanges 
can be revalued based on transaction prices on the revaluation date. If such transaction prices are not available, the 
midpoint of the quoted buy and sell prices of the shares on their main stock exchange on the reference date should 
provide a useful approximation... For debt securities, the market price is the traded price on the reference date and 
includes accrued interest. If that value is not available, other methods of approximation include yield to maturity, 
discounted present value, face value less (plus) written value of discount (premium), and issue price plus 
amortization of discount (premium).”  
27 While we know of no countries that provide detailed accounts of the individual assets in their reserve 
portfolios, some central banks provide general information regarding their reserve management strategies, which are 
often published in annual reports.  De Gregorio (2011) provides a discussion of the motives for reserve 
accumulation in emerging economies with a special focus on the Chilean approach. 
28 Another issue that arises in characterizing reserve losses is that large-reserve-loss countries during the 
crisis are mainly countries whose reserves first rose and then fell, so that they both gained and lost reserves during 
the crisis.  This suggests that the timing used to measure reserve changes, especially during the global financial 
crisis, matters. 
29 These data are available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm.  There are two 
studies that provide limited, but more disaggregated, information on currency composition. Truman and Wong  
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SDDS Reserve Template foreign currency reserve (ForexR) composition data (SEC and DEPO), 
together with proxies for returns to securities (10-year government bond yields) and deposits (3-
month inter-bank yields)
30, and the quarterly COFER approximations of currency 
denomination
31, to strip out passive interest income.  We use the Reserves and Related Items line 
in the BOP (Res_BOP) to strip out passive valuation changes. Figure 4 presents the underlying 
security and deposit data that we use in the interest income calculations.  The long-term (ten-
year) government bond yields fell gradually over this time period, while the short-term (three-
month) bank yields are more dispersed and volatile prior to the GFC. 
 
Figure 3: Yields used in the interest income simulation 





(2006: Table 3) provide an annual breakdown of the currency composition of reserves for selected countries in 2004 
(based on Central Bank annual reports).  Lim (2006: Table 2) disaggregates the COFER-reporting countries into 
dollar-area and euro-area countries for end-of-year 1998 through 2004 and the first three quarters of 2005.  He does 
not identify the countries in each area due to confidentiality issues.  It is also the case that some individual countries 
provide currency composition information.  For example, the Swiss National Bank provides current currency 
denomination data on reserve assets at http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/assets/id/assets_reserves and historical data are 
available through 2006 at http://www.snb.ch/en/iabout/stat/statpub/histz/id/statpub_histz_actual. Likewise, the US 
provides a current breakdown of reserves into euro and yen at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/IR-Position/Pages/01272012.aspx.  The UK provides the most comprehensive data which includes detailed 
monthly current and historical (starting in 1999) currency denomination data at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/reserves/index.htm,  
30 These monthly data are from HAVER (http://www.haver.com/our_data.html).  The long-term securities 
used include: Japanese 10-year benchmarked government bond yields EOP, UK Government Bonds 10-Year 
Nominal par yield EOP, US 10-Year Treasury Bond yields at constant maturity EOP, and Euro-area 10-year 
benchmark government bond yields EOP.  The short-term deposits used include: Euro-area 11-17 3-month 
EURIBOR Rate EOP, UK 3-Month London Interbank offered Rate EOP, US 3-Month London Interbank offered 
Rate EOP, and  the Japan Call Rate uncollateralized 3-Month EOP. 
31 COFER information is only available quarterly (so that in our calculations monthly shares are the same 
within the quarter) and at an aggregated level.  We use the COFER information in such a way that issuing countries 
are not allocated shares of their own currency.  For example, Euro assets are only included in the portfolios of 
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An important assumption we must make for this “simulated” interest income calculation is that 
each country’s shares of foreign currency reserve assets in securities and deposits are not 
adjusted over the month; interest income in period t+1 is based on shares of securities and 
deposits in various currency denominations reported in period t.  
The equations to follow describe our approach.  Recall the basic definition of the change in 
reserves:  
⊿IR = ⊿ForexR + ⊿NonCR 
 







                                                                          
                                                                        
 
 
If we decompose the level of foreign currency reserves at t+1 into the level that would have been 








where simulated ForexR in t+1 is: 
  
(5.2)   ForexR









Figures 4 to 8 present selected country level plots of actual reserves (the solid lines) and our 
“simulated” reserves series (the dashed lines) over the period 2000-2011.  (Appendix B provides 
these graphs for all the countries in our sample). The second plot in each figure shows the 
difference between actual and simulated reserves (the bars), which we term “actively managed 
reserves” and the accumulation of actively managed reserves (the solid line). In each of these 









seasonally adjusted GDP calculations after 2007). While the full set of country plots indicate 
wide variation in reserve accumulation patterns, for many countries actual reserves exceed our 
“simulated” series (indicating active reserve accumulation) prior to the crisis period.  During the 
crisis period many countries experienced active reserve depletion (Bulgaria, Korea and Russia 
all show this pattern), while in the post-crisis period, many countries are back on their pre-crisis 
trend lines and are again actively accumulating reserves (Russia, Korea and Singapore provide 
good examples of this pattern).   
 
Figure 4: Estimates of Bulgaria’s Foreign Reserve Management 
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Figure 6: Estimates of Russia’s Foreign Reserve Management 
  
Figure 7: Estimates of South Korea’s Foreign Reserve Management 
  
Figure 8: Estimates of Singapore’s Foreign Reserve Management 
  
 
Reserve data for developed countries generally show little evidence of active reserve 
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before the global financial crisis).
32  Japan in 2003-4 and Switzerland in 2009-2010 are two 
interesting exceptions. Both countries actively intervened to stop excessive appreciation of their 
domestic currencies over this time period.  In the case of Japan, active interventions involving 
yen sales (and usd purchases), 35 trillion yen in total, occurred in 2003 through the first quarter 
of 2004. In addition, Japan intervened once on September 15, 2010 to sell 2.1249 trillion yen (a 
purchase of USD 250 billion at that day’s exchange rate).
33  These intervention operations are 
reflected in the large increases in actual reserves as well as active reserve accumulation in figure 
5.  Likewise, the plots for Switzerland show the dramatic accumulation of dollar and euro-
denominated assets that occurred in March 2009 through May 2010 as a result of interventions to 
stop the appreciation of the swiss franc. 
Figure 9 shows average yearly active reserve accumulation for our full sample of SDDS 
compliant countries starting in 2000 as well as the emerging market sample.  The data indicate 
that most countries were actively accumulating reserves in the five years prior to the GFC, 
reserve growth slowed dramatically in 2008-9, and in the case of the emerging market sample 
went negative in 2008, and then rapidly “bounced back” to pre-GFC levels by 2010. 
 
Figure 9 Average Active Reserve Accumulations 






32 It is worth noting that when countries join the Euro-zone we typically see a dramatic fall in foreign 
reserves, which reflects the fact that Euro-denominated assets are no longer considered foreign reserves for these 
countries.  This pattern is very apparent in the time series for the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
33 The Ministry of Finance in Japan discloses the daily intervention numbers (with a time delay). Prior to 
this intervention, there had not been an intervention for six and half years.  After this intervention, there was one 
intervention on March 18, 2011, one week after the mega Earthquake in Japan to calm the yen market, as a part of a 
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6.  Reserve Changes during the GFC 
 
When a country faces sudden capital outflows, there tends to be enormous pressure to 
depreciate the currency.  Monetary authorities have a limited set of policy choices to counter this 
pressure; they can (1) allow the exchange rate to depreciate, (2) use foreign reserves to defend 
the exchange rate, (3) raise the interest rate in the hope that a higher interest rate will discourage 
capital outflows, (4) impose capital controls, or (5) use a combination of all of the above. If the 
pressure against the domestic currency is moderate, authorities often allow the exchange rate to 
depreciate. However, in cases where the pressure is strong, concerns typically arise that 
depreciation will be too precipitous and may encourage further capital outflows, which could 
rapidly result in a systemic crisis in the country’s financial institutions. It is in these 
circumstances that authorities typically resort to the use of foreign reserves to absorb capital 
outflow pressure and to moderate the speed of currency depreciation. This will also be the case 
for countries that especially value exchange rate stability.  The third approach, raising the 
domestic interest rate to make domestic assets more attractive, has the disadvantage of 
dampening domestic demand and adversely affecting domestic investment, especially if capital 
outflow pressure is strong.
34   
  In order to measure the strength of exchange rate market pressure (EMP) during the 
global financial crisis we calculate the correlation between changes in actively managed reserves 
and changes in the exchange rate during the country-specific crisis periods, the two components 
of EMP.  Figure 10 shows combinations of exchange rate changes and active additions or 
subtractions to foreign currency reserves, as measured by our “actively managed” reserves series, 
for the SDDS compliant countries during the global financial crisis. The exchange rate and 
reserve changes for each country are measured during the country-specific crisis period (as 
shown in the shaded portions of figures 4-8; based on a peak-to-trough real SA GDP calculation 
after 2007).  Note that because exchange rate and reserve changes are measured over each 
country’s crisis period, countries that share the same currency (for example the euro-zone 
countries) will not necessarily scatter vertically on the graph as they would if changes were 
measured over the same time period for all countries.  The figure shows that the Japanese yen 
appreciated most among the currencies of sample countries, while Denmark was the largest 
reserve accumulator and Belarus experienced the largest reserve decline.  Country labels are 
included in the figure for all countries involved in swap arrangements during the crisis, 
interestingly there seems to be no systematic relationship between involvement in swap 
                                                            
34 A number of recent studies have analyzed the policies available to countries experiencing capital 
outflows based on their explicit preferences toward exchange rate stability and monetary independence within a 




arrangements and reserve depletion, though the figure indicates that most of the countries 
receiving swap lines did experience currency depreciations. 
Figure 10 indicates that the majority of countries in our sample experienced both a loss of 
reserves and a depreciation of their currency during the financial crisis.  The regression line 
suggests that the relationship between foreign currency reserve and exchange rate changes was 
mildly negative during this time period, and when we exclude the developed countries the 
negative slope is less steep. While in past financial crises authorities typically either allowed 
their currency to lose value or depleted reserves, these data suggest that during the global 
financial crisis authorities were forced to do both. Interestingly, if we use the international 
reserves data (IR) to measure reserve changes during the country-specific crisis, rather than our 
active management series, we find that more of the observations appear in the upper-right 
quadrant of the figure, suggesting that fewer countries that allowed their currencies to depreciate 
also depleted reserves during the crisis.  The reason for this is that ‘international reserves’ 
include components that do not reflect reserve policy actions during the crisis (recall from 
equation 4.4 that changes in IR include: interest income, valuation changes, changes in the non-
currency components, and active management), which obscures the role of reserve sales. 
 




























































































Note: country labels are included for those countries that were involved in swap arrangements 





Our time-series graphs of the country-by-country reserve data in section 5 and Appendix 
B suggest that the same country may well change their approach to reserve accumulation in 
reaction to global economic circumstances.  Many of the emerging market countries experienced 
rapid reserve accumulation in the pre-crisis period, indicating that they actively increased their 
foreign currency reserve stocks in the 2007-8 period (when many of the advanced countries were 
already in crisis) with depletion of reserves only starting in late 2008 and 2009.  Our data also 
indicate that many of these same countries reverted to their pre-crisis accumulation trends by 
2010. This “reserve bounce back” is apparent in the full sample of countries as shown in Figure 
11, and is similar to the “GDP bounce-back” documented in Didier, Hevia and Schmukler 
(2010).  Focusing on GDP growth over this period, they find a bounce-back effect in economic 
activity: countries that suffered greater collapses in the global financial crisis tend to be those 
that enjoyed larger growth recoveries.  We will attempt to relate what we know about country’s 
reserve accumulation strategies to their subsequent GDP growth in the next section. 
 










































































7.  Reserves and Economic Performance 
 
Our analysis of reserve accumulation trends prior to the crisis, and the decisions made by 
countries regarding exchange rate depreciation and active reserve management, suggest that 
foreign currency reserves were considered a counter-cyclical policy tool, at least in some 
countries, during the global financial crisis.  A close inspection of the data also suggests that the 
timing of the crisis in different countries matters in terms of understanding active reserve 
management patterns.  While the global financial crisis may have officially started in late fall of 
2007 for the advanced countries (the NBER dates the US recession from December 2007 through 
June 2009), for many emerging market countries the crisis started much later (these country-
specific crisis dates are listed in table 3).  The data indicate that emerging market countries were 
generally continuing to accumulate reserves up to the point at which their own output levels 
began to decline.  
Did these reserve management strategies result in less drastic output declines during the 
crisis period?  A recent study by Llaudes, Salman and Chivakul (2010) finds evidence among the 
emerging market countries that pre-crisis reserve holdings were associated with a positive 
(though diminishing at very high levels of reserves) moderating impact on output collapse.  
Likewise, Frankel and Saravelos (2010) find that the level of reserves in 2007 is a significant 
(negative) leading indicator of the cross-country incidence of the global financial crisis.
35  
It may be that the counter-cyclical value of reserves should not be measured in absolute 
terms, but rather relative to a precautionary motive benchmark which reflects “reserve 
adequacy”.  The same dollar value of reserves might protect countries differently, depending on 
specific country characteristics.  In Figure 12 we examine the relationship between a measure of 
reserve adequacy (international reserves measured against GDP in 2006Q4) and output growth 
during the crisis.  In this case, we find a negative relationship, indicating that countries with 
higher reserve adequacy prior to the crisis experienced greater output declines during the crisis. 
  
                                                            
35 Frankel and Saravelos (2010) are focused on finding leading indicators rather than causes of the crisis, 
but the authors conclude that their results “lend credence to the usefulness of reserve accumulations policies as 
insurance during periods of crisis” (page 27).  Rose and Spiegel (2010) also examine cross-country indicators of the 
crisis but do not find robust links between various potential causes of the crisis, including the pre-crisis level of 
reserves (and various measures of reserve adequacy), and its incidence across countries.  
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It is also useful to examine the relationship between foreign currency reserve management 
and post-crisis economic performance.  Did the countries that used their reserves during the 
global financial crisis experience faster GDP bounce-back after the crisis?  Figure 13 indicates 
that foreign currency reserve sales during the country-specific crisis periods are positively 

























































The relationship between reserve accumulation and post-crisis output growth is consistent 
with the reserve bounce-back pattern we found earlier (shown in Figure 11).  It suggests that 
those countries that used their reserves during the crisis, and replenished their reserve stocks 
after the crisis, were also the countries that experienced higher GDP bounce-back by 2010Q4.  
This does not suggest that building reserve stocks leads to higher economic performance, but it 
does indicate a positive (unconditional) association, at least for this sample of countries in this 
time period. 
In order to more formally investigate the relationship between reserve stocks prior to and 
during the crisis, and real GDP growth after the crisis, we examine a cross-section regression 
which allows us to include additional macro controls.  Table 4 presents these regression results.  
The dependent variable is real GDP growth after the country-specific crisis through 2010Q4.  
The explanatory variables include real GDP growth prior to the crisis, real GDP growth during 
the crisis, the reserves-to-GDP ratio prior to the crisis (in 2006Q4), reserve growth during the 
crisis (measured using International Reserves and Active-Management), exchange rate changes 
during the crisis, and changes in the terms-of-trade
36 during the crisis.  The first column in table 
4 presents results for our full sample of countries and subsequent columns restrict our sample in 
                                                            
36 Terms of Trade (TOT) data are from Haver and are measured as the percent change during the country-specific 
crisis, so that a larger number indicates an improvement in that country’s terms-of-trade.  Kazakhstan and Russia 




various ways.  The second column excludes the developed countries, the third column excludes 
countries that are not SDDS compliant, the fourth column excludes major commodity exporters, 
the fifth column is restricted to countries with low reserves-to-debt ratios, and column six 
restricts the sample to those countries with high interest differentials relative to the US, which we 
label as “carry-trade counterparty countries”. 
In column 3 of Table 4 we measure reserve growth during the GFC using the active-
management series (which excludes interest income and valuation changes), which is only 
available for the SDDS compliant country sample.  Real GDP growth prior to the GFC 
(measured from 2005 to the quarter prior to the country-specific crisis) is positive and highly 
significant in the first two columns, suggesting that those countries that were on a high growth 
trend prior to the crisis were more likely to return to higher growth after the crisis.  Real GDP 
growth during the (country-specific) crisis did not influence post-crisis recovery in any of the 
regression specifications.  In all the country samples we find that the larger the reserve stocks 
were, relative to GDP before the GFC started, the higher was post-crisis growth.  The statistical 
significance of the coefficient on exchange rate changes, terms-of-trade changes, and reserve 
changes during the crisis is less consistent across the columns, but the estimates often indicate 
that countries which experienced larger depreciations during the crisis and larger improvements 
in their terms-of-trade, had better post-crisis recovery (most likely through higher exports) .  
Likewise, depletion of reserves during the crisis (measured using the active management series), 
conditional on having accumulated reserves prior to the crisis, improved post-crisis growth. 
We restrict our sample of countries in column 4 of the table to exclude countries that are 
primary commodity exporters, which include a number of the top reserve accumulating 
countries. These countries may behave differently than the rest of the sample, in that reserve 
accumulation is more likely driven by commodity price movements, than the precautionary or 
exchange rate stability motives.  The sample of primary commodity exporter countries is too 
small (12) to consider separately, but it is interesting to note that when we exclude these 
countries from our sample, pre-crisis reserve stocks are still found to be positively associated 
with post-crisis recovery.   
The role of short-term debt both in motivating countries to build up reserves as well as its 
role during the global financial crisis has been the subject of a number of recent studies, 
including Blanchard, Faruqee and Das (2010), Frankel and Saravelos (2010) and Rose and 
Spiegel (2010).  We find, as most studies do, that countries with higher short-term debt to GDP 
ratios accumulate larger stocks of reserves, reflecting the precautionary motive.  The relationship 
between debt and reserves during the crisis is less well understood.  One of the hallmarks of the 
global financial crisis was the inability of countries to refinance their debt obligations. They 
faced a sudden reversal of capital flows, and deleveraging ensued. In this circumstance we might  
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expect that countries with large debt obligations would tap into their reserves to smooth the 
deleveraging process.  Yet a number of countries, with Korea being a prime example, opted to 
draw on their Fed Swap lines rather than fully deplete their reserves. In column 5 of table 4 we 
consider whether countries with relatively low reserves-to-short-term-debt ratios (below the 
median for the full sample of countries) behaved differently than other countries in the sample. 
In this sample of countries we find that larger reserve stocks prior to the crisis increased GDP 
recovery, but exchange rate depreciation, terms-of-trade changes, and reserve depletion during 
the crisis did not make a difference.  
Another of the explanatory variables that has been found to be important in explaining 
reserve accumulation is the interest differential; countries with interest rates that are higher than 
those in the US tend to accumulate more reserves.  These countries accumulate reserves, despite 
their higher fiscal costs of maintaining their reserve stock. These same countries may 
inadvertently be counter-parties to the carry trade.  Carry-traders borrow in low interest 
currencies and invest in high interest currencies, while most reserve building countries invest in 
low interest foreign currencies (mostly the US dollar) and borrow at the (relatively higher) 
domestic interest rate. In other words, this sample of countries is likely to experience the largest 
valuation losses, yet the regression results reported in column 6 indicate that they also benefitted 
from high pre-crisis reserve stocks.  One explanation for why these carry-trade counterparty 
countries accumulate reserves (even as they lose money on the reserve stocks) is that they may 
be concerned about the stability of their domestic banking system, which is likely financing the 
carry trade (see Shin (2010).  We also find that exchange rate depreciation (which would lead to 
capital gains on reserves) played an important role, in terms of GDP recovery, for these 
countries. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, we make use of the SDDS Reserve 
Template data which provides a breakdown of the types of assets (securities and deposits) 
included in the foreign currency reserve component of official reserves. This data, along with 
assumptions on currency composition and the applicable interest rate on these assets, make it 
possible to estimate the passive interest income and valuation changes which are included in 
measures of official reserves.  Second, we derive the actively managed component of foreign 
currency reserves by subtracting the interest income and valuation changes from the official 
reserve data. As a consequence, we have much better estimates of actual purchases and sales of 
reserve assets, which are conceptually similar to foreign exchange intervention. Third, we find 
that emerging market economies did deplete foreign currency reserves during the global financial  
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crisis. Many countries that were reserve accumulators before the crisis used their reserves and 
allowed their currencies to depreciate during the crisis. We also find evidence of “reserve bounce 
back”; after the crisis many emerging market countries went back to their pre-crisis reserve 
accumulation trends. Fourth, we find that real GDP growth recovery after the crisis was stronger 
for countries with large pre-crisis accumulations of foreign currency reserves.  The influence of 
currency depreciation and reserve depletion during the crisis on GDP growth after the crisis 
differed depending on which countries are included in the sample.  
Official reserve accumulation among emerging market economies is a contentious topic. 
Trading partners often accuse reserve accumulators of having mercantilist motives, and 
domestically large reserve stocks are sometimes criticized as wasteful resource 
allocation.  Emerging market economies often rebut these criticisms by citing the self-insurance 
value of reserves. They argue that reserves reduce the probability of falling into a crisis, and that 
the value of self-insurance exceeds the costs. Our findings support the view that higher reserve 
accumulations prior to the global financial crisis are associated with higher post-crisis GDP 
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Central banks Line size ($ billion) Starting 31-Dec-08 30-Jun-09
European Central Banks Full allotment 13-Oct 291.35 59.9
Swiss National Bank Full allotment 13-Oct 25.18 0.37
Bank of England Full allotment 13-Oct 33.08 2.5
Resreve Bank of Australia 30 29-Sep 22.83 0.24
Reserve Bank of New Zealand 15 28-Oct
Bank of Japan Full allotment 29-Sep 122.72 17.92
Bank of Canada 30 29-Sep
Danmarks Nationalbank 15 29-Sep 15 3.93
Sveriges Riksbank 30 29-Sep 25 11.5
Norges Bank 15 29-Sep 8.23 5
Bank of Korea 30 29-Oct 10.35 10
Banco do Brasil 30 29-Oct
Banko de Mexico 30 29-Oct 0 3.22
Monetary Authority of Singapore 30 29-Oct
Source: Authors' summary from Goldberg, et al. (2011)Tables 2 and 3




















Data Used in Regressions Analyses 
Variable Description  Frequency  Source 
           
IFS_IR  International Reserves  Monthly  IFS 
ForexR  Foreign Currency Reserves  Monthly  IMF SDDS database 
Active 
Management 
change in ForexR - interest income - valuation 
changes Quarterly  author calculations 
Res_BOP  Reserves and Related Items  Quarterly  IFS BOP 
GDP_WEO  Annual GDP (current prices)  Annual 
World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) 
Reserves/GDP   International Reserves over WEO GDP      IFS and WEO 
GDP  Quarterly GDP (national currency)  Quarterly  IFS 
GDP deflator  GDP deflator or CPI deflator if not available  Quarterly  IFS 
EMP 
Quarterly Exchange Rate Growth (relative to 
USD) Quarterly  IFS 
Interest 
Differential  Domestic minus US interest rate  Monthly  IFS, Central Bank of Taiwan 
ST Debt/GDP 
 [(ST liabilities to BIS banks + ST International 
debt securities + cross-border loans from BIS 
reporting banks + International debt 
securities)/WEO GDP] *100  Quarterly 
WB (JEDH) and WEO 
Primary Exporter 
Indicator 
Dummy for countries in the top 25% of 
primary exporters  Quarterly 
IFS 
TOT  Terms of Trade  Quarterly  Haver 
GFC-Crisis  Dummy indicating country-specific peak to 





Table 4: Determinants of Real GDP Growth After the GFC (based on Quarterly Observations through 2010Q4) 


















            
Real GDP growth prior to GFC  0.694***  0.871**  0.190  0.182  -0.334  0.192 
 (0.186)  (0.323)  (0.141)  (0.137)  (0.195)  (0.149) 
Real GDP growth during GFC  0.153  0.215  -0.264  -0.261  -0.551  -0.250 
 (0.202)  (0.383)  (0.324)  (0.306)  (0.636)  (0.311) 
Reserves/GDP (2006Q4)  0.181*  0.318*  0.286***  0.281***  0.387***  0.275** 
 (0.0972)  (0.155)  (0.0564)  (0.0512)  (0.0476)  (0.119) 
EMP during GFC  0.0755  0.371**  0.304***  0.290***  0.125  0.296*** 
 (0.0924)  (0.172)  (0.0901)  (0.0911)  (0.137)  (0.0991) 
TOT change during GFC    -0.238  0.313  0.330*  -0.0301  0.344 
   (0.350)  (0.219)  (0.192)  (0.0982)  (0.220) 
Reserve growth during GFC (IFS_IR) -0.0155  -0.0463    -0.0120  0.00922  -0.00787 
 (0.0326)  (0.147)    (0.0234)  (0.0269)  (0.0253) 
Active Management during GFC      -0.00771*       
     (0.00398)       
Constant -0.0195  -0.190*  -0.0311  -0.0253  0.0252  -0.0271 
 (0.0331)  (0.104)  (0.0240)  (0.0243)  (0.0277)  (0.0260) 
            
Observations 67  24  33  33  23  29 
R-squared 0.453  0.557  0.580  0.582  0.554  0.548 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; dependent variable is real GDP growth after the country-
specific crisis period through 2010Q4; real GDP, Exchange Market Pressure (EMP), the Terms-of-Trade (TOT), Reserve Growth and 
Active Management variables are calculated over the country-specific crisis period (based on a peak-to-trough real SA GDP 
calculation after 2007). IFS_IR reserve growth includes gold, IMF loans, SDRs, SWFs, drawn swap lines. The Active Management series 
excludes interest income, valuation changes, gold, IMF loans, SDRs, SWFs, swap lines. EMP is the exchange rate change 




Appendix A: The Evolution of the SDDS guidelines 
 
When Mexico announced its devaluation on December 20, 1994, investors were surprised 
to realize that Mexican international reserves had not been disclosed in a timely manner.
37 For 
example, Mexico did not disclose its reserve position in the month (November) prior to the 
devaluation. The IMF was criticized for its perceived lack of surveillance and responded by 
increasing its emphasis on transparency and disclosure of international reserves and other data.
 38   
Quick calculations from trade data and other statistics led investors to the realization that 
Mexican international reserves were most likely exhausted. Moreover, investors realized that the 
Mexican government had large external liabilities in the form of short-term, (de facto) dollar-
denominated, government bonds (tesobonos).
39  Heavy selling pressure occurred in the two days 
after the announcement of the devaluation, and the Mexican government was forced to allow the 
peso to float on December 22, the peso lost half of its pre-devaluation value in a week. It was 
later argued that if the Mexican government financial information, in particular the international 
reserves position, had been disclosed in a timely manner, market discipline would have worked: 
investors would have demanded a higher premium on Mexican bonds much earlier, forcing the 
Mexican government to take corrective actions. Thus, timely disclosure of foreign exchange data 
and other macroeconomic information became a focus of reform in the international financial 
community.  
The IMF described its motivation for the SDDS and GDDS initiatives as follows: “work 
on standards and codes began in the wake of the 1994–95 international financial crisis, which 
underscored the role that information deficiencies play in contributing to market turmoil. 
…financial markets, for example, relied on information that too often was incomplete and out of 
date and thus could adversely affect resource allocation and the pricing of country risks. In 
response to these circumstances, the international community asked the IMF—in line with its 
role in the international financial system—to set standards in the provision of economic and 
financial statistics to the public. In response to this request, the IMF established the SDDS in 
1996 as the first of its core standards” (Alexander (2008; p.7).   
When the Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997, proper disclosure of international 
                                                            
37 IMF (1995; p. 56) states, “… the stock of foreign reserves remained fairly stable until the end of October. 
In November, selling pressures on the Mexican peso increased again, and foreign exchanges reserves in Mexico 
declined $4.8. This reduced the stock of reserves to $12.9 billion by the end of November. The decline in reserves in 
November was not publicly announced until after the devaluation of the Mexican peso in December” (emphasis is 
the authors’). 
38The Mexican team at the IMF had not closely monitored the macroeconomic and capital market situation 
since their Article IV visit to Mexico City in the spring of 1994. 
39The tesobonos were peso-denominated short-term government bonds, but the interest rates were linked to 
the dollar-peso interest rate, making them essentially dollar denominated liabilities to the Mexican government. See 
IMF (1995; chapter 3).  
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reserves became an issue for the Asian governments. The issue was not the total amount of 
international reserves, but their composition and usability. By June 1997, all of the crisis-hit 
Asian countries—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea—had subscribed to the SDDS.  
When the baht was hit by waves of speculative attacks in the spring of 1997, in particular 
mid-May 1997, the Bank of Thailand became the counterparty of hedge funds and investment 
banks in the dollar-baht swap arrangements. By late May the Bank built up huge forward 
contracts to deliver US dollars in three to six months. Essentially, the Bank of Thailand had 
exhausted international reserves if the current and future positions were consolidated.  
The Bank of Thailand became a counterparty to huge speculations against the Thai baht 
and lost sizable foreign reserves in forward positions, but their statistics (which only provided 
current positions) showed ample reserves (this reporting was IMF-consistent at the time). On 
July 2, 1997, the Bank of Thailand floated the exchange rate.  The market at that time had yet to 
realize the extent of the Bank’s exposure to forward contracts. After the forward position was 
revealed in August 1997, at the time of IMF program approval, the market was surprised because 
the exposure was higher than market estimates.  This episode made it clear that the “forward 
position” of the central bank should be included in the foreign reserve data release. After the 
crisis the IMF responded by requiring reporting on forward contracts.   
The Korean government during November – December 1997 deposited foreign reserves 
into Korean commercial banks, and Korean commercial banks used them to repay chaebol firms’ 
foreign liabilities.  Thus, “usable” reserves were much lower than international reserves in 
official statistics (then consistent with IMF SDDS). These examples, as well as other Asian 
country responses to capital outflows with dwindling foreign reserves, are described in detail in 
Ito (2007a)).  Deposits with domestic commercial banks became a source of difficulty in the 
interpretation of private-and official-sector external transactions and, in the case of emerging 
market countries, a source of suspicion for adequacy of international reserves at the time of 
crisis.
40   
                                                            
40 Japan, along with a number of other countries, holds a portion of its official dollar deposits, which are 
counted as reserves, in domestic banks.  The problem with this is that these deposits are not claims on a foreigner, 
unless commercial banks hold enough foreign assets themselves.  When Japan puts together its BOP accounts it 
includes the increase in reserves as a financial outflow.  At the same time it must remove that same amount from the 
outflows of its banks.  But the banks may use the official dollar deposits to buy, for example, US Treasury bills.  So 
the data show the Japanese official sector increasing dollar deposits and the U.S. thinks it sees the Japanese private 
sector buying or holding T-bills, while the Japanese BOP show a reduction in the private bank claims on the U.S.    